Mind Brain Identity Thesis

Mind Brain Identity Thesis-81
This in itself seems like a shortcoming, since if we are to reduce all mental concepts to physical concepts and in doing so demonstrate that they are identical, surely we must be able to provide physical explanations or descriptions for concepts like 'what it is like to love one's parents'?A CSM might reply that one can say simply that what it is like can again be explained in terms of the CNS states and processes that are identified with the sensations caused by the experience; that an explanation of what it is like to experience mental state X and what that mental state X is are different needn't invalidate CSM, since we can find parallels in everyday language that we find unobjectionable.

This in itself seems like a shortcoming, since if we are to reduce all mental concepts to physical concepts and in doing so demonstrate that they are identical, surely we must be able to provide physical explanations or descriptions for concepts like 'what it is like to love one's parents'?A CSM might reply that one can say simply that what it is like can again be explained in terms of the CNS states and processes that are identified with the sensations caused by the experience; that an explanation of what it is like to experience mental state X and what that mental state X is are different needn't invalidate CSM, since we can find parallels in everyday language that we find unobjectionable.To put it in perspective, since the idea that a thought might be reduced to a few neurons doesn't seem too odd, a CSM would have to hold that the phenomena known as 'loving one's parents' can be similarly reduced to certain material phenomena in the CNS.

Generally, necessary facts are deemed to be a priori, and so discoverable through study of language, e.g.

"one plus one equals two", or "a bachelor is an unmarried man".

if minds are identical to brains, then brains are identical to minds.

Strict identity statements are therefore logically symmetrical.

For example: Human mental state X is identical to human brain state Y Gorilla mental state X is identical to gorilla brain state Y Human mental state X is not identical to gorilla mental state Y etc.

This one retreat for type-type identity theorists opens up a can of worms though, since it again begs the question: should one not take into account the physical nature of individual brains, the contexts of mental and brain states, the age of the subjects, etc?This becomes especially problematic between different brains.If I share the belief: "the capital of Italy is Rome", with another person, must our brain states be the same? An analogy with a hard drive might be useful, since a hard drive may store the data in any number of ways across the surface of the disc, whilst still retaining the same information.For example, I might refer to "the table", by which I mean an object with legs on which I can rest other objects; I might also refer to "that lump of wood", by which I mean an object created out of pieces of wood that sits in my room.Though each statement appears to refer to different physical concepts, they each refer to the selfsame object, and so a CSM can claim that one can reduce all mental concepts to material concepts, even if this seems counter-intuitive.But is this not beginning to sound more like token-token identity theory, in which each mental state is said to be identical to an individual brain state, allowing for no generalising categorisation, but still not explaining how one can have a logically symmetrical identity statement when one single mental state can have many different brain states.That is unless one can claim that each different brain state means that there is an entirely different mental state.But because identity theory came from scientific discoveries, the thought is that it cannot be necessary.But then if two things are identical, must that fact not be necessary?In other words, conscious experiences can be categorised into types, each with its characteristic mental and brain states.Objection: the brain is labile (open to change), type-type identity theory seems difficult to maintain.

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