As previously mentioned, these advancements accompanied Clinton’s abandonment of the annual renewal of China’s MFN status as a contingency of China’s human rights record, which had been a strong coercive incentive for reform within the PRC. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which escalated dangerously to a show of arms between the two powers after the U. granted then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui an entry visa, stands as the most confrontational moment in Sino-Soviet relations since the Cold War. Even more important, however, is the response that the crisis elicited from Clinton’s administration.
As previously mentioned, these advancements accompanied Clinton’s abandonment of the annual renewal of China’s MFN status as a contingency of China’s human rights record, which had been a strong coercive incentive for reform within the PRC. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which escalated dangerously to a show of arms between the two powers after the U. granted then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui an entry visa, stands as the most confrontational moment in Sino-Soviet relations since the Cold War. Even more important, however, is the response that the crisis elicited from Clinton’s administration.Tags: Rebt Homework AssignmentsDissertation Droit AdministratifHow Long Is A 300 Page EssayService Learning Projects EssaysEnglish Grammar Test Papers IntermediateErnest Hemingway EssayEssays On Good Vs EvilRogerian Style Essay
The uneasy relationship in the early 1990s was accordingly characterised by Chinese distrust and American toughness, with central disputes over the trade imbalance, nuclear proliferation, and human rights.
The conventional view, which is certainly validated to a significant extent, is that the United States found itself freed from self-restraint to criticise China over issues and controversies it had hitherto quelled. President Bill Clinton also initiated the negotiations that would shortly thereafter lead to China’s lauded accession to the World Trade Organisation.
As Wang makes clear in her investigative work, one explanation is that the Bush administration contained “no senior-level officials with any significant amount of China experience.” Although it is difficult to tell at what point in the Bush presidency the administration would have softened its tone towards the PRC, the terrorist attacks of September eleventh, 2001 provided a premature impetus for a complete reorientation of China policy.
Vice President Cheney, Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld and their departments believed that a policy..least of active constraint, should be carried out regarding China, which presumed...treating China as a potential strategic adversary.
Proposing a “constructive, cooperative, and candid” relationship with the PRC, Bush made an unprecedented two visits to China within a half-year after September 11, 2001. In June 2004, the White House pressured the Pentagon to cancel Major-General John Allen’s visit to Taiwan.
A third summit meeting took place at the Bush family ranch in Texas in 2002, signifying the highest frequency of meetings between the top leaders of the U. That December, as Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was visiting the U.By that time, after the discovery of Soviet troops in Cuba and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U. – Soviet détente had ended and Washington was ever less sanguine about it reemerging. The issue of human rights was likewise intertwined with strategic objectives, agrees Ming Wan, a Chinese historian: “Human rights in China was rarely mentioned by the government, the media or human rights NGOs in the United States throughout the 1970s and only incrementally in the 1980s…China was a ‘human rights exception’ even when the United States pursued an articulated global human rights policy.” From the perspective of U. foreign policy, the evidence amply supports this characterisation. But since the end of the Cold War, Sino-American relations have operated within a drastically altered international context requiring an equally distinct bilateral relationship.As the Soviet Union came to appear more ominous, China grew more valuable to the United States as a strategic ally. Ross, “that the United States now sought a ‘stable marriage’ so as to better contend with Soviet U. In the pivotal year of 1989, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the brutal suppression of the Tiananmen protests dealt a dual blow to the U. Throughout the Cold War, the Chinese had stood, for America, at the forefront of reform in the communist world – “daring, innovative, and increasingly capitalist.” That it now stood at the turn of the decade as a lingering bastion of communism seen anew as corrupt and backwards in the wake of the Tiananmen massacre led to a profound disillusionment as the public turned away from China.Segal’s answer, “the Middle Kingdom is a middle power - China matters far less than it and most of the West think, and it is high time the West began treating it as such” resonates considerably less today; since then, both China and opinion regarding it have advanced significantly, giving rise to new fears and perceptions of U. Alarm over conciliatory policies in this newly perceived context is commonplace and unsurprising, as exemplified by the sharp criticism of Obama’s China policy in the wake of his state visit to Beijing last month.His critics in Congress, nongovernmental organizations and the general public bemoan that a hard line on China, rather than the open-handed approach of the Obama presidency and his compromising character, would fashion a tougher and ultimately safer stance on China for national security and prosperity.One year later, he announced his momentous decision to issue an ultimatum for the PRC to change its human rights practise in 12 months or face suspension of its MFN status.Yet, in 1994, Clinton reversed course, preaching instead a revised policy of “comprehensive engagement,” to the bafflement and suspicion of both American and Chinese onlookers.The problem arises from the framing of the post-Cold War relationship as one in which the United States could finally pursue a policy guided by the full scope of its national interest. However, beneath much of the rhetoric and public policy debates, U. presidents since the Cold War have rarely acted as suggested by their aggressive policy outlines.In this sense, it tends to see negotiation with China not as part of a pattern of rational strategy implementation, but rather as periodic concessions eroding what would otherwise promote U. Patient and calculated negotiation with the PRC has, in fact, been the norm.However, this common narrative belies the complex realities of the Sino- American relationship. Despite journalistic and scholarly claims to the contrary over the years, current U. foreign policy regarding China follows in a long pedigree of bilateral relations that have, over the last two decades especially, formed and severely constrained the range of policy options available in the present day. leaders and the much-publicised occasional “crises” that have marked the tumultuous nature of Sino- American diplomacy, this study argues that U. foreign policy towards China has not only exhibited remarkable continuity since and during the Cold War, but will continue to be unremarkably predictable in coming years. foreign policy towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is divided into two distinct periods – the Cold War and the period since the Cold War – with the latter exhibiting constant shifts in policy orientation both between and within presidential administrations. The resulting 1982 Communiqué was a result of aggressive Chinese negotiation; although it did not promulgate a specific end to arms sales, it did bring China much closer to its ultimate goal by placing heavy restrictions on Washington’s arms policy.It unfortunately makes up in popular appeal, by indulging in a public fearful of its national decline, what it lacks in a sound understanding of past and present U. The realities and complexities of this relationship effectively limit the influence that any one ideology or personality in power may have. Rather, the perceived multiplicity of policy options is a misperception arising from the traditional and systemic conflict between Congress and the Executive over China policy. The détente with China orchestrated by Nixon and Kissinger in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué opened nearly two decades of bilateral relations based on mutual strategic imperatives under a Cold War setting. and China cooperated strategically against their common enemy, and refrained from quarrelling over Taiwan as a result. arms sales to Taiwan after 1979 and instigated a round of negotiations that, as a characteristic and high-profile example, does well to reveal the nature of the U. When Washington attempted to moderate Beijing’s stand by balancing arms sales to Taiwan with arms sales to the PRC, Chinese leaders refused to buy U. “The negotiating process,” observes Ross, “revealed… Washington’s fear that China would carry out its threat, thereby undermining the strategic relationship with China.” It was very much in Washington’s interest, both at the outset of China’s “opening” and towards the end of the Cold War, to play down the importance of the contentions including Taiwan and human rights, and push for Sino-American cooperation.